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by 
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Almost every society could be considered a society based on connections. As Lawrence 
M. Friedman said, “in this society, as in every society, who you know and what your 
connections are, whether you are rich or poor, educated or uneducated, articulate or 
inarticulate, has always mattered greatly—one way or the other.”1 The logic is very simple. 
No one will feel safe and secure when entering into a significant transaction with a stranger.  
The same notion of a “connection,” however, might mean more in the context of the Chinese 
society than in the context of society in the US. In China, connections, or guanxi, are 
important, not only in a business context, but also at the personal level.2 Compared to US 
“connections,” which tend to rely primarily on a quid pro quo dynamic, guanxi are typically 
understood as being primarily socio-emotional relations. 3  “Intimately related to family, 
kinship, ethnic and other personalistic relations,” guanxi thus constitute more meaningful, as 
well as powerful connections, connections who are frequently relied upon in both business 
and personal contexts.4  
 
A connection per se is neither the angel nor the devil. To the contrary, it is a neutral 
term. A connection could be used for different, or even opposite, purposes. In some 
circumstances, a connection could be an angel, as healthy, moral, and lawful connections will 
benefit both businesses and their stakeholders in the local market.5 In other circumstances, 
connections are abused to advance the interests of firms and their corrupted partners at the 
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price of defrauding consumers, bullying small competitors, and polluting the commercial 
culture.6  
 
More importantly, connection-based bribery has been a special target in contemporary 
Chinese society.7 Anti-corruption efforts and reforms toward a transparent and competitive 
market are key elements of the contemporary Chinese culture. 8  A misinterpretation of 
contemporary Chinese culture may have created, and may continue to create, more bribery 
scandals on the part of multinational corporations (MNCS).9  
 
To analyze this point, this paper focuses on the scandal plaguing global healthcare giant, 
GlaxoSmithKline LLC (GSK).  On July 2, 2012, GSK agreed to plead guilty and pay $3 
billion to resolve its criminal and civil liability arising from the company’s unlawful 
promotion of certain prescription drugs, its failure to report certain safety data, and for 
alleged false price reporting practices in the US.10 The allegations include two counts of 
introducing misbranded drugs, Paxil and Wellbutrin, into interstate commerce and one count 
of failing to report safety data about the drug, Avandia, to the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA).11  Furthermore, GSK was accused of paying for publication of articles about their 
drugs in medical journals.12 The fine was the largest combined federal and state healthcare 
fraud recovery in a single case in the history of the United States.13   
 
Before GSK had the chance to rebuild its image, the company was embroiled in another 
bribery scandal in China. In June 2013, a criminal investigation of GSK began in China. GSK 
allegedly bribed government officials, medical associations, hospitals, and individual doctors, 
to open more distribution channels and raise product prices.14 The Chinese police claimed 
GSK funneled up to three billion yuan ($490 million) to travel agencies in order to facilitate 
bribes to doctors and other officials.15 More than 700 middlemen and travel agencies were 
alleged to have helped channel nearly $500 million in kickbacks to those who prescribed pills 
from the UK pharmaceutical since 2007.16 The Ministry of Public Security detained four 
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13 Press Release, supra note 10. 
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upper-level executives of GSK China, and at least eighteen other employees were arrested.17 
The GSK scandal quickly became one of the “Top 10 White-collar Crimes” in 2013.18  
 
On September 19, 2014, The Changsha Intermediate People’s Court found the company 
guilty of bribing nongovernmental personnel and imposed on GSK a fine of nearly $500 
million, the amount of the company’s bribes19 and the largest corporate fine ever imposed in 
China.20 The court also sentenced GSK’s former country manager for Britain, Mark Reilly, 
along with four other company managers, to prison sentences that could have lasted up to 
four years (the court has agreed to suspend the sentences so long as the convicted commit no 
further offenses in China).21 In a statement released just hours after the verdict, GSK stated 
that it “fully accepts the facts and evidence of the investigation, and the verdict of the 
Chinese judicial authorities… GSK P.L.C. sincerely apologizes to the Chinese patients, 
doctors and hospitals, and to the Chinese government and the Chinese people.” 22 
 
Although GSK has very specific internal rules against commercial bribery, these rules 
appear to have been easily circumvented through the use of third parties, such as travel 
agencies.23  The major function of the travel agency was to invent corporate meetings that 
would have required staff travel.24 The budget for these fictitious meetings would then be 
used to bribe doctors to prescribe certain drugs.25 The doctors involved were issued a credit 
card from the company and the kickbacks they received were transferred to the cards the day 
after drugs were prescribed.26 
 
It has been further alleged that GSK offered bribes to doctors not only in China, but also 
to doctors in other countries, including Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Poland.27 According 
to an April 15, 2014 report, GSK was fully cooperating with the Polish government's 
investigation after the British media accused it of paying bribes to Polish doctors.28 Between 
2010 and 2012, under the facade of "educational services," GSK representatives allegedly 
paid Polish doctors to promote GSK's asthma drug, Seretide. 29 The local prosecutor has 
charged eleven doctors and a GSK regional manager over the alleged corruption. The 
prosecutor of the Polish region of Lodz found evidence in documents given to doctors by 
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GSK to support claims of corrupt payments in more than a dozen different health centers, 
where there was no evidence that "patient education" had taken place.30 Furthermore, GSK 
has said that it was "looking into accusations" that its Iraqi business had hired government-
employed doctors and pharmacists to act as paid sales representatives for the company.31 In 
April 2014, GSK announced that it is investigating similar bribery allegations in Jordan and 
Lebanon.32 
 
In addition, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) has started its own investigation. The 
US is investigating whether GSK violated US anti-bribery laws, specifically the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), in China. 33  Additionally, Britain’s Serious Fraud Office 
(SFO) is taking steps to prosecute or fine companies that commit bribery overseas, which 
would likely implicate GSK. 34  No charges by either the DOJ or SFO have yet been 
announced.  Furthermore, the GSK bribery scandal is not a singular event in China.  Just one 
month after the investigation of GSK began, Beijing municipal authorities set up a joint 
investigation team to investigate the French pharmaceutical company Sanofi after a Chinese 
newspaper published bribery allegations against that company.35 
 
Although GSK is not the only multinational pharmaceutical company to be investigated 
for its business in China, it has suffered the most damage to date as many Chinese doctors 
have shunned its drugs and sales representatives.36 While rivals of GSK (such as Roche and 
Novartis) have experienced continued growth, GSK’s drug sales slumped 61 percent in the 
third quarter in China following the announcement of the investigation.37 This dip in sales is 
greater than investors were predicting 38  and was caused in part by the considerable 
uncertainty in China concerning the extent of GSK’s continued drug sales, which has led 
hospitals to turn to more reliable alternatives.39 Additionally, consumer discontent has likely 
played a strong role in decreasing GSK’s China sales. 40 There is a common perception in 
China that foreign medicines are overpriced due to the costs of corruption associated with 
their marketing. 41  Given the GSK scandal’s considerable publicity, it appears that Chinese 
patients have directed their resentment of over-priced, foreign medications at GSK, putting 
pressure on Chinese doctors to avoid prescribing GSK products when possible. 42 The sales 
hit the hardest were those of drugs with easily accessible substitutes.43 
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In light of these scandals, we seek to analyze the complicated harms triggered by the 
alleged corrupt practices of GSK and other multinational corporations (MNCs) in connected 
societies in order to identify the causes of these scandals and to provide suggestions for 
reform.  Part I provides an overview of Chinese culture followed by identification of some of 
the harms that may be triggered by corrupt practices of businesses in Part II.  Part III 
examines the international anticorruption framework while Part IV considers why the alleged 
GSK bribery scandal was possible in China.  We then analyze the need for improvement of 
the evaluation and incentive system for professional sales representatives in Part V, leading 
to suggestions for reform in Part VI.  Concluding remarks then follow.  
 
I. Understanding Chinese Culture and Society  
 
It is difficult to have a deep understanding of China. Historically speaking, China has 
been a connection-based, agricultural society, with a brief exposure to rule of law (in the 
modern sense) in comparison with its five thousand years of civilization. 44 Yet, a close 
examination of Chinese culture reveals that commercial corruption is neither encouraged nor 
tolerated.45 
 
First, Chinese culture, especially the mainstream philosophy, is against any form of 
corruption.46 As President Xi Jinping outlined in his speech at the College of Europe on April 
1, 2014, China has a civilization of over 5,000 years.47 Over 2,000 years ago, there was “the 
period of one hundred masters and schools of thought.” 48 Great thinkers, such as Laozi, 
Confucius, and Mozi, explored a wide range of topics from the universe to the Earth, from 
men’s relationship with nature to relations among people, and between the individual and 
society. 49 The extensive and profound schools of thought they established covered many 
important ideas, such as the moral injunction of fidelity to one’s parents and brothers and to 
the monarch and friends, a sense of propriety, justice, integrity and honor, emphasis on 
benevolence and kindness towards fellow people, and the belief that man should be in 
harmony with nature, follow nature’s course, and constantly pursue self-perfection.50 These 
values and teachings still carry a profound impact on the Chinese people’s way of life today, 
underpinning the unique value system in the Chinese outlook of the world.51  Chinese culture 
pays close attention to the integrity and morality of people and commercial corruption would 
thus be contrary to these basic tenets   
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Second, the Chinese market economy operates based on the rule of law, 52  and could be 
called a legal economy or an economy ruled by law.53 China introduced the state policy of 
the rule of law into the Chinese Constitution as late as 1999 and there are legal rules for 
combatting corrupt practices.54 Both the Anti-Unfair Competition Law and the Criminal Law, 
discussed below, prohibit commercial bribery and other corrupt practices.55 According to the 
white paper on the Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics, published by the 
Information Office of the State Council, by the end of August 2011, the Chinese legislature 
had enacted 240 laws including the current Constitution, 706 administrative regulations, and 
over 8,600 local regulations.56 As a result, all legal branches have been instituted; basic and 
major laws of each branch have been established; and related administrative regulations and 
local regulations have been adopted. A socialist system of laws with Chinese characteristics 
has been solidly put into place.57 There is no legislation that legalizes corrupt practices. 
 
Third, corrupt practices are contrary to ongoing reforms in China.58 Although there are 
unalienable links between the past, the present, and the future, China has undergone and 
continues to undergo a great number of unprecedented reforms since the late 1970s, 
especially from November of 2012, when new Chinese leaders came to power. As President 
Xi Jinpin said in the abovementioned speech at the College of Europe, “China is a country 
undergoing profound changes. Reform, which was first forced upon us by problems, goes 
deeper in addressing the problems. We know keenly that reform and opening-up is an 
ongoing process that will never stop. China’s reform has entered a deep-water zone, where 
problems crying to be resolved are all difficult ones. What we need is the courage to move 
the reform forward.” 59  In addition to ambitious and comprehensive reform policies 
concerning the market economy and the rule of law declared by the Chinese Communist 
Party, China has been vigorously fighting corruption. For instance, the Chinese courts have 
convicted and punished 31,000 criminals in 29,000 cases of embezzlement, bribery and 
breach of duty, including several serious cases involving Bo Xilai, the former party chief of 
Chongqing Municipality, and Liu Zhijun, former minister of railways.60  
 
II. Harms Triggered by Corruption  
 
This part turns to an examination of the various harms, which may be triggered by 
corrupt practices of firms.  These include damage to fair and transparent competition, harm to 
consumer welfare, and harm to commercial culture. 
 
A. Damage to Fair and Transparent Competition  
                                                 
52 Chul-kyu Kang, Market Economy and Corporate Governance  
- Fairness and Transparency for Sustainable Growth, 6th Global Forum on Reinventing Government (2005), 
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53 Id. 
54 Ed Silverman, Did Glaxo Violate Its Corporate Integrity Agreement?, FORBES, July 24, 2013. 
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57 Id. 
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http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/szyw/201311/18/t20131118_1767104.shtml. 
59 Jinping, supra note 45.  
60 Highlights of work report of China's Supreme People's Court, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 10, 2014, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2014-03/10/c_133174809.htm. 
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Although it is  difficult to quantify the exact value of the competitive advantage resulting 
from bribery, it has been estimated that GSK derived substantial benefits from its bribes in 
the Chinese market of more than $150 million, including revenue from higher drug prices.61 
Because GSK is in direct competition with domestic Chinese firms, as well as other MNCs, 
the gains of GSK also reflect the losses sustained by competitors who were unwilling to 
deviate from free-market competition.  
 
Moreover, in addition to putting GSK’s competitors at an unfair competitive 
disadvantage, GSK’s bribes (and those of other firms) 62   have undermined the Chinese 
government’s efforts to promote a fair and transparent market economy.63 China passed the 
Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China on September 2, 1993 to 
fight commercial bribery and to promote fair competition in the market.64Article 8 of this 
Law specifically targets commercial bribery. 65  To strengthen the enforcement of anti-
corruption laws, the State Authority of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) issued the Interim 
Provisions on Banning Commercial Bribery on November 15, 1996.66 Serious commercial 
bribery is also banned by Chinese Criminal Law.67 According to Zhou Qiang, president of 
China's Supreme People's Court (SPC), Chinese courts have convicted and punished 31,000 
criminals in 29,000 cases of embezzlement, bribery and breach of duty in 2013. 68 The SPC 
plans to step up efforts against corruption including cases of embezzlement, bribery and 
breach of duty. 69  
 
By offering bribes, GSK challenged the sincerity of the Chinese government’s extensive 
legislation on private sector bribery, suggesting that bribery is an unofficial norm within the 
Chinese market—the law notwithstanding.70 With its record-breaking fine against GSK,71 
China has signaled the contrary to the international community, a message that will hopefully 
                                                 
61 Bradsher & Buckley, supra note 19. 
62 See, Pharmaceutical Giants Rethink Rebate Marketing, supra note 35.  
63 See Jinping, supra note 45.  
64 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan bu zheng dang jing zheng fa (中华人民共和国反不正当竞争法) [Anti-
Unfair Competition Law of the Peoples Republic of China] (promulgated by Order No. 10 of the President of 
the People’s Republic of China on Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 8 (LawInfoChina) (China), 
translated in http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=648&lib=law. 
65 Id. 
66 Criminal Law, arts. 163–164; Guan yu jin zhi shang ye hui lu xing wei de zan xing gui ding (关 
于禁止商业贿赂行为的暂行规定) [Interim Provisions on Banning Commercial Bribery] 
(promulgated by Order No. 60 of the Dir. General of the State Admin. for Indus. and Commerce on Nov. 15, 
1996, effective Nov. 15, 1996), art. 5 (China), translated in http://cclp.sjtu.edu.cn/article/?NewsID=3027. 
67 Criminal Law of the P.R.C. (promulgated by Standing Comm., effective Oct. 1, 1997) (amended Mar. 14, 
1997), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgvienna/eng/dbtyw/jdwt/crimelaw/t209043.htm. 
68 The report on the SPC's work at the third plenary meeting of the second session of China's 12th National 
People's Congress (NPC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, capital of China, March 10, 2014 
[hereinafter SPC Report], available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014npcandcppcc/2014-
03/10/content_17336143.htm. 
69 Id. 
70 See Karl M. Meessen, Fighting Corruption Across the Border, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1647, 1647 (1995) 
(“Corruption [in] private business has no little role in discrediting…freshly installed free market systems.”). 
71 Plumridge & Burkitt, supra note 20. 
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diminish the negative effects that the bribes of GSK and other MNCs have had on the 
integrity of fair play among firms in China. Of course, this may take some time.72 
 
B. Harm to Consumer Welfare  
 
According to an old Chinese proverb, “When the snipe and the clam grapple, the 
fisherman profits.”73 Consumers will be some of the most important beneficiaries of fair 
competition among pharmaceutical companies. 74  The fiercer the competition, the more 
benefits the consumers will acquire in terms of better quality and lower prices.75  If, however, 
competitors are interested in building their competitiveness by bribery, instead of better 
products or services, the quality of the goods or services will not be improved and the price 
will not be lowered.76 Thus, consumers will suffer double damages from bribery—higher 
prices and poorer quality of the goods or services.77  
 
Through its bribes in China, GSK inflated its medicine prices and passed on the cost of 
hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes directly to patients. If patients pay medical bills 
themselves, they are directly hurt by the increased costs. Even if the medical bills are paid by 
commercial insurance companies or the social security system, patients are still victims, 
because patients or their employers will pay increased insurance premiums or taxes.78 A GSK 
senior executive held in detention admitted that the bribes would be reflected in higher 
medicine prices; 79 thus, a product that cost only 30 yuan ($4.89) to make could end up 
costing patients 300 yuan ($48.94).80 A significant portion of this differential may constitute 
a direct imposition of the costs of bribery passed onto consumers.81  
 
C. Harm to the Commercial Culture 
 
In addition to damaging its own image, GSK has also compromised the integrity of the 
commercial culture.82 The Chinese government has been actively welcoming MNCs to do 
                                                 
72 See Kang, supra note 52, at 8 (“When companies lose consumer confidence, it will directly affect share 
prices, aggravating profits and threatening long-term existence of companies.”). 
73 Learning Chinese, CHINA CULTURE, http://www.chinaculture.org/gb/en_learning/2003-
09/24/content_20580.htm.  
74 See Marie M. Dalton, Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification of Cultural Norms in the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 583, 585-89 (2006). 
75 See generally Kevin D. Dayaratna, Competitive Markets in Health Care: The Next Revolution, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION (2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/08/competitive-markets-in-health-care-the-
next-revolution. 
76 Cf. Charles Kenny, Construction, Corruption, and Developing Countries, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 4271 (2007), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7451. 
77 Id. 
78 See Sarah L. Barber & Lan Yao, Health insurance systems in China: A briefing note, World Health Report 
Background Paper 37, 4.1-4.4 (2010), available at 
http://www.who.int/healthsystems/topics/financing/healthreport/37ChinaB_YFINAL.pdf. 
79 Yin Pumin, Clamping Down on Corporate Bribery, BEIJING REVIEW, Aug. 1, 2013, 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/business/txt/2013-07/29/content_557941_2.htm. 
80 Id. 
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82 Kevin Done, High Levels of Bribes Harm Rate of Growth, FIN. TIMES, June 28, 1996, at 4 (citing a report by 
the World Bank that finds corruption to be among the most important factors creating popular resistance to 
market reform); see Neelima Mahajan & Major Tian, The Going Gets Tough for MNCs in China, CKGSB 
Knowledge, Aug. 20, 2014, http://knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2014/08/20/china/the-going-gets-tough-for-mncs-in-
china/. 
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business in China for the past three decades.83 Moreover, Chinese consumers and the public 
in general have considerable expectations of foreign brands, as foreign brands not only mean 
new products supporting advanced technology, new management skills, and new capital,84 
but also new ideas and a new commercial culture.85  
 
Undoubtedly, Chinese businesses and consumers are disappointed with the alleged 
misbehaviors at GSK and other MNCs.86  Of course, the laws that forbid MNC bribery apply 
with equal force to domestic firms.87 Unfortunately, unspoken bribery is also thought to exist 
in some domestic firms in China.88 The public, however, hopes and believes that MNCs will 
provide good examples for Chinese domestic firms, as the MNCs create a new business 
culture helping to eradicate local unspoken corruption.89  It also seems that a consensus has 
been reached to step up enforcement of China’s anti-corruption laws,90 which have already 
been applied to domestic firms, on MNCs.91 
 
III.  The International Anticorruption Framework  
 
Many countries, including China, have recently enacted statutes to combat foreign 
corruption and bribery practices.92  These efforts have taken on two primary paths: public and 
private. In the United States, the FCPA is a significant example of a dominant public 
enforcement mechanism. As the first domestic law to criminalize foreign bribery, it inspired 
the OECD to draft a major treaty on anti-bribery. 93  In the private realm, international 
arbitration tribunals hold contracts obtained through bribes unenforceable.94 These arbitration 
tribunals penalize companies and individuals who pay bribes, not foreign officials.95 This 
Part begins with a description of China’s anticorruption laws, continues with an overview of 
                                                 
83 Yigang Pan & Peter S. K. Chi, Financial Performance and Survival of Multinational Corporations in China, 
20 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT J. 359, 360 (1999). 
84 Indeed, MNC goods and services often demand a premium in Chinese markets, where (regardless of actual 
quality) consumers tend to believe that MNC goods and services are more reliable than domestic alternatives, 
due, for example, to better technology and consumer-friendly policies; Benjamin Shobert, The Ethical 
Challenges of Doing Business in China’s Healthcare Economy, HEALTH INTEL ASIA, Feb. 5, 2014, 
http://www.healthintelasia.com/ethical-challenges-business-chinas-healthcare-economy/; Jill Gabrielle Klein, 
Richard Ettenson & Marlene D. Morris, The Animosity Model of Foreign Product Purchase: An Empirical Test 
in the People’s Republic of China, 62 J. MARKETING 89 (1998); see also Mahajan & Tian, supra note 82. 
85 See generally Chung Chen, Lawrence Chang & Yimin Zhang, The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in 
China's post-1978 Economic Development, 23 WORLD DEVELOPMENT (1995). 
86 See Hirschler, supra note 15 (explaining how a slump in sales indicates market disapproval). 
87 See, e.g., Interim Provisions on Banning Commercial Bribery, supra note 66. 
88 Shobert, supra note 84; see SPC Report, supra note 68. 
89 Id. 
90 Bradsher & Buckley, supra note 19. 
91 David W. Simon & Robert H. Iseman, Domestic Anti-Bribery Enforcement May be on the Rise in China: 
Multinationals Must Focus on Anti-Corruption Compliance, LEGAL NEWS: EYE ON CHINA QUARTERLY 
NEWSLETTER, http://www.foley.com/spring-2013-eye-on-china-newsletter-04-29-2013/ (2013) (noting the 
relatively large number of corruption investigations that have taken place between 2000 and 2009, many of 
which involved domestic companies). 
92  David Kennedy & Dan Danielsen, Busting Bribery: Sustaining the Global Momentum of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS, 17-26. 
93 See Evan P. Lestelle, Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, International Norms of Foreign Public 
Bribery, and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 83 TUL. L. REV. 527, 530-43 (2008). 
94 See id., at 545-46. 
95 Rashna Bhojwani, Student Note, Deterring Global Bribery, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 66, 67 (2012) (citing World 
Duty Free, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, ¶ 181, 46 I.L.M. at 369-70).  
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the FCPA in the United States, and concludes with a brief comparison of the sanctions of the 
two regimes. 
 
A. China’s Anticorruption Laws 
 
Two statutes are of particular importance to China’s anticorruption efforts: the Criminal 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (Criminal Law)96 and the Anti-Unfair Competition 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (AUCL).97 Commercial bribery is considered an 
unfair competition practice under Chinese law.98 To restrict unfair competition among firms, 
China passed the AUCL in 1993. Article 8 of the law states,  
 
[a] business operator shall not resort to bribery, by offering money 
or goods or by any other means, in selling or purchasing 
commodities. A business operator who offers off-the-book rebate 
in secret to the other party, a unit or an individual, shall be deemed 
and punished as offering bribes; and any unit or individual that 
accepts off-the-book rebate in secret shall be deemed and punished 
as taking bribes.99  
 
China’s Criminal Law also bans commercial bribery. Article 164 penalizes offering 
bribes to non-public employees in business companies or enterprises.100 Article 389 penalizes 
offering bribes to public employees of state-owned companies or non-profit organizations.101 
Article 391 penalizes offering bribes to government agents, state-owned companies or non-
profit organizations. Article 393 penalizes corporations offering bribes to public 
employees. 102  The Chinese Criminal Law is not confined to domestic bribery. As more 
Chinese firms pursue overseas markets, Paragraph 2 of Article 164 of Chinese Criminal Law 
punishes Chinese firms offering bribes to public employees in foreign countries or 
international public organizations, for the purpose of acquiring an unfair commercial 
interest.103 GSK has broken both the Chinese Anti-Unfair Competition Law and the Criminal 
Law.104 
 
                                                 
96 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing fa (97 xiu ding) (中华人民共和国刑法(97修订)) [Criminal 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (1997 Revision)] (promulgated by Order No. 5 of the 
Chairman of the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong. on July 6, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 
1980 and amended by the Fifth Session of the Eighth Nat’l People’s Cong. on March 14, 1997) 
(LawInfoChina) (China) [hereinafter Criminal Law], translated in 
http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=354&lib=law. 
97 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan bu zheng dang jing zheng fa (中华人民共和国反不正当竞 
争法) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the Peoples Republic of China] (promulgated by Order 
No. 10 of the President of the People’s Republic of China on Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 
1993), art. 8 (LawInfoChina) (China), translated in http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=648&lib=law. 
98 See Zhang, supra note 45 (noting the current trend in China toward both increased regulation and prosecution 
of commercial corruption, including bribery).  
99 Law of P.R.C. Against Unfair Competition, supra note 55. 
100Criminal Law of the P.R.C., supra note 67.. 
101 Id.
．．．
 
102 Id.
．．．
 
103 Id. 
104 See Law of P.R.C. Against Unfair Competition, supra note 55; Criminal Law of the P.R.C., supra note 67; 
Bradsher & Buckley, supra note 19. 
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The penalties under the Criminal Law depend on the identity of the party offering the 
bribe. 105  Acts involving official bribery may include penalties anywhere from criminal 
detention to life imprisonment and/or confiscation of property.106 Commercial bribery may be 
penalized anywhere from criminal detention to 10 years’ imprisonment and/or criminal 
fines.107 Those involved in the management of the company directly responsible for the issue 
may be punished as individual bribers.108 The AUCL provides for penalties including a fine 
up to approximately $32,000 and disgorgement of illegal income for violations that do not 
amount to a criminal act. 109  Under the AUCL, the competitors may allege harm by 
commercial bribery and bring a civil claim for damages before the People’s Court. 110  
Although the AUCL and Criminal Law have not always been applied impartially,111 it is anticipated that 
foreign and domestic firms, as well as public and private firms, will soon be regulated and protected on an 
equal basis under the rule of law.112  
 
 Since the meeting of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 
2012, President Xi Jinping has reiterated the significance of “rule of law” in the country’s 
anti-graft efforts. The Fourth Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee also set a goal of 
“governance according to the law” in its detailed Decision on Some Major Questions in 
Comprehensively Promoting Governing the Country According to Law.113 Thus, governance 
based on the rule of law is the guideline in the nation’s massive anticorruption campaign 
which has become even more powerful and widespread since the 18th Party Congress.114 
         
While the law has teeth, the market has eyes.  The Chinese Supreme Procuratorate has set 
up a special data base of commercial bribery cases, which is available to the public for 
inspection.115 Once publicly disclosed, a firm’s bribery record will likely have a negative 
impact on future business.  For instance, firms that have engaged in bribery will likely be put 
at disadvantage when they bid for the government procurement contracts or governmental 
funds.   
 
 
 
      B.  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) 
                                                 
105 Wantao Yang, Emilia Shi, Timothy P. Peterson, & Robertson Pak, Understanding China’s Approach to 
Anticorruption, Jan. 28, 2014, at 2, 
http://www.mmlawus.com/Data/Files/Articles/Corporate%20Counsel%20China%20article.pdf. 
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 See Strong arm of the law, CHINA ECON. REV., Jul. 13, 2012, http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/strong-
arm-law (“Of the 500,000 corruption investigations undertaken in China between 2000 and 2009, 64% involved 
foreign companies, according to a 2010 study by Anbound Group, a Beijing-based consulting company.”) 
112 See Jaime A. FlorCruz, Opinion: Corruption as China’s top priority, CNN, Jan. 6, 2013, 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/06/world/asia/florcruz-china-corruption.  
113 Donald Clark, Decision of the Fourth Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee (English), GENIUS, 
http://genius.com/Central-committee-of-the-chinese-communist-party-decision-of-the-fourth-plenum-of-the-
18th-ccp-central-committee-english-annotated. 
114 Wu Jianxiong, Lawbraking graft should be unexceptionally punished, CHINA DAILY, 
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2015-01/12/content_19296257.htm. 
115 The Supreme People’s Procurate on Bribery files provisional regulations, 
http://www.yfw.com.cn/xhfzdacx/. 
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As mentioned above, in addition to China’s investigation of GSK and its corrupt 
practices, the US Department of Justice has started an investigation. The US is investigating 
whether GSK violated US anti-bribery laws, specifically the FCPA, in China.116  
 
Through the FCPA, the US criminalized payment of bribes by domestic companies, as 
well as foreign companies listed on the US stock exchanges, to foreign officials.117 The US 
has encouraged other countries to follow suit.118 The OECD, the Organization of American 
States, the Council of Europe, the United Nations, and the African Union have all adopted 
anticorruption provisions similar to the FCPA.119  
 
The FCPA was passed as an amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 in 
an effort to eliminate foreign corruption by US firms overseas.120 The anti-bribery provisions 
ban US companies, US citizens, foreign companies listed on a US stock exchange, as well as 
a “person” acting within US territory, from paying or offering to pay directly or indirectly, 
money or anything else of value to a foreign official to obtain or retain their business.121 
These provisions range from prohibiting cash payments to foreign officials to more nuanced 
prohibitions against indirect gifts with intangible benefits.122 Although anyone committing 
bribery within the US jurisdiction can be found to be violating the FCPA anti-bribery 
violations, foreign officials who receive the bribe cannot be prosecuted under these 
provisions.123 The FCPA applies to all US businesses and persons, regardless of whether the 
bribery occurs within the US or abroad and to foreign companies or persons utilizing 
interstate commerce. To constitute a violation of the FCPA, the foreign official must be aware 
that the payment received is payment for some illegal action.124  
                                                 
116 US Prosecutors Add China Bribery Allegations to GSK Probe, supra note 33. 
117 Steven, R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 
WASH & LEE L. REV. 229 (1997). 
118 At the 1997 OECD Convention signatory countries agreed to enact measures that were similar to the FCPA. 
In 2009, the OECD Council adopted two more recommendations relating to tax measures and reporting foreign 
bribery. Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Expansion of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, GA. L. REV. 489, 511 (2011). 
119 Id. at  512.  
120 Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 N.C.J. INT THL. & 
COM. REG. 83, 84 (2007).  Beyond criminalizing the payment of bribes to foreign officials, the FCPA requires 
public companies meet certain standards with respect to their books, records, and accounting practices. The 
FCPA was passed in response to the Watergate scandal and the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) investigation that discovered over $300 million in payments by US firms to foreign officials. The report 
included major US MNCs such as Boeing, Gulf Oil, and Exxon Mobil.  The FCPA was amended in 1988 and 
1998. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (amendments), Pub. L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1415 (1988); International Anti-
Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366; McSorley, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 749, 750-51 (2011). The provision also applies to entities that are required to file periodic 
reports routine with the SEC, regardless of which stock exchange the company's shares are traded.   Id. at 765. 
121 Id. at 750-51. 
122 Id. at 757. 
123 Id. 
124 This is done partly in an attempt to make sure the government contracts are not inhibited by the FCPA.  One 
exception and two affirmative defenses exist for the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. “Grease payments” to 
foreign officials in order to “expedite or secure the performance of routine government actions” are permissible 
under the statute.  Payments fit this exception when they are routine and occur within the ordinary business of 
the foreign official. Courts focus on the intent of the individual making the payment and what the true purpose 
of the payment is. U.S. v. Kay, 359 F.2d 738, 740 (5th Cir. 2004).  The affirmative defenses to the FCPA anti-
bribery provisions are: (1) a payment, gift or promise of “anything of value” to a foreign official . . . if that type 
of payment is legally allowed under the country’s laws, and (2) the payment for a bona fide expenditure, which 
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The FCPA imposes both criminal and civil penalties on those acting on behalf of US 
companies.125 Under §2B4.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, any individual found in violation 
of the anti-bribery provisions can be fined up to $100,000 and five years in prison per 
violation 126  If a corporation is found to have violated the anti-bribery provisions, the 
maximum criminal penalty per violation is $2 million.127 The DOJ and the SEC may increase 
the fine by combining both civil and criminal penalties.  Penalties vary depending on the 
level of due diligence and the effectiveness of compliance. 128 Civil penalties of up to $10,000 
may also be added for anti-bribery provision violations.129 In addition, if a corporation or 
individual violates the FCPA, they may be subject to suspension from contracts with 
government agencies.130   
 
Recently, there has been a surge in the enforcement of the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions. 131  Corporations are under greater scrutiny by the SEC and the DOJ. Both 
agencies, along with the federal courts, are interpreting the FCPA more broadly,132 increasing 
not just their enforcement actions, but the penalties imposed on the parties as well.133  
 
Because every instance of bribery or record-keeping violations can count as a separate 
act for penalty purposes, considerable fines and penalties may be imposed in cases involving 
longstanding patterns of corruption.134 Over the past decade, the DOJ and SEC have made 
their willingness to take advantage of this provision abundantly clear. In 2008, for instance, 
                                                                                                                                                       
lacks a corrupt purpose. McSorsley, supra note 120, at 765.  The courts have not yet interpreted the second 
defense.  An expenditure will likely be considered reasonable and bona fide by the DOJ when (1) it is made 
directly to the service provider as opposed to the government official, and (2) where the company making the 
payments does not have pending business with the government agency whose employee is receiving the benefits 
of the payment.  Id. at 765-66.  See FCPA Op. Proc. Rel. 2004-01 (2004); FCPA Op. Proc. Rel. 2004-03 (2004).  
The DOJ and the SEC are both responsible for enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. The 
DOJ is solely responsible for any criminal investigation and enforcement. The SEC is primarily responsible for 
any civil investigation; however, the DOJ may conduct a parallel investigation. .McSorley, supra note 120, at 
767.  To provide guidance to issuers and businesses, the DOJ uses advisory opinion letters and the SEC may 
write no-action letters. Id. at 768. 
125 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-123, 91 Stat. 1494; McSorsley, supra note 120, at 
771. Prior to the 1998 amendments, the penalties were only civil.  
126 Id. at 770. The US Sentencing Guidelines are effective advisory in determining how court will react. Id. at 
771. In contrast, individuals violating the accounting provisions, may be fined up to $5 million and imprisoned 
for up to 20 years under § 2B1.1 of the Guidelines. Id. at 769.  Sarbanes-Oxley increased the maximum 
penalties to their current levels. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 810 (2002) 
(enacting § 1106). 
127 McSorsley, supra, note 120 (in contrast, the maximum penalty for the violation of the accounting provisions 
by a corporation is $25 million).  
128 Id.  
129 Id.  
130 Id. at 771.  
131 Benjamin Gruenstein, Upswing in FCPA Cases Results in Increased Judicial Oversight, NEW YORK L. J. 
SPECIAL SELECTION, Jul. 8, 2013 (“From 2008 through May 2013, the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged 
over 80 individuals with violating the FCPA, over twice the number that was prosecuted in the 10 preceding 
years.”). 
132 Krever, supra note 120, at 94. 
133 See Dan Slater, Halliburton Breaks FCPA Settlement Record for U.S. Companies, WALL ST. J. JAN. 26, 2009, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/01/26/halliburton-breaks-fcpa-settlement-record-for-us-companies/. 
134 Aaron G. Murphy, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Practical Resource for Managers and Executives 23-24 
(2010). 
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Siemens agreed to an FCPA settlement of $800 million with the DOJ and SEC ($450 million 
in criminal fines to the DOJ and $350 million in civil damages to the SEC). 135 Due to 
Siemens extensive cooperation with their investigations, the DOJ and SEC agreed to lower 
criminal fine and penalties;136 additionally, the DOJ and SEC did not require Siemens to 
formally plead guilty to bribery charges, allowing the company to continue bidding for 
public-sector projects in the US. In the years following the Siemens case, other notable fines 
and penalties imposed under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions have included (among many 
others) $559 million paid by Halliburton to settle charges that it bribed officials in Nigeria 
while constructing a gas plant,137 $400 million in fines paid by the British weapons maker 
BAE Systems, $137 million by the French telecom company Alcatel-Lucent, and $200 
million by the German auto manufacturer Daimler.138 
 
Today, the US regulatory agencies appear focused on oil and gas, technology, 
pharmaceuticals and medical supplies industries.139 In 2012, the SEC charged Eli Lilly and 
Co. for improper payments made by its subsidiaries to foreign government officials to win 
business in Russia, Brazil, China, and Poland.140  Lilly eventually agreed to pay $29 million 
to settle the charges without admitting or denying any of the allegations.141 In the same year, 
the SEC charged Pfizer with making illegal payments to foreign officials through its 
subsidiaries in Bulgaria, China, Croatia, and Italy (among others) in order to secure 
regulatory approvals and increased prescriptions for Pfizer products. Pfizer agreed to pay $45 
million in its settlements.142  
 
The largest fine administered in a single FCPA case thus far was the $800 million penalty 
imposed on Siemens in 2008.143 In total, the company paid $1.6 billion in fines and costs in 
Germany and the US and more than $1 billon for internal reforms and investigations.144 The 
combined $1.6 billion US-German fine was the largest imposed for bribery in modern 
corporate history.  Siemens was allowed to plead guilty to violating accounting provisions of 
the FCPA rather than bribery because of its cooperation with SEC and DOJ investigations.145  
 
The Siemens case is significant due to the sheer breadth and amount of money 
involved. 146  The annual bribery budget of the corporation between 2002 and 2006 was 
approximately $40 to $50 million.147 Various Siemens executives and employees arranged 
payments that eventually were pocketed by officials all around the globe.148 The company 
                                                 
135 Dan Slater, Siemens Settles in U.S. for $800 Mil, Leaving $$ for German Authorities, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 
2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/12/15/siemens-settles-in-us-for-800-mil-leaving-for-german-authorities/. 
136 Murphy, supra note 134, at 24.  
137 Slater, supra note 135.  
138 Murphy, supra note 134, at 24. 
139 Westbrook, supra note 118.  
140 SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml.  
141 Sharon Blinkoff & Valerie Charles, Greatest Pharmaceutical Executive Risk: DOJ and the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, http://www.pharmacompliancemonitor.com/greatest-pharmaceutical-executive-risk-doj-and-the-
foreign-corrupt-practices-act/5053/.  
142 Id. 
143 Richard L. Cassin, Alcoa lands 5th on our Top Ten list, THE FCPA BLOG, Jan. 10, 2014, 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/1/10/alcoa-lands-5th-on-our-top-ten-list.html. 
144 Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At Siemens, Bribery Was Just a Line Item, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008. 
145 Id.  
146 Id.  
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
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paid its largest bribes in China, Russia, Argentina, Israel, and Venezuela.149  
 
The executives interviewed believed that they had to bribe officials in order to receive 
the contracts and retain all of their employees. As Mr. Siekaczek, a midlevel executive who 
was convicted during the scandal, stated, “[w]e thought we had to do it,” or “we’d ruin the 
company.”150 Once various countries began to investigate the company’s suspicious account 
activities, however, Siemens quickly changed its direction. The corporation hired an 
American law firm, Debevoise & Plimpton, to conduct an internal investigation and to work 
with the federal investigators. A number of senior managers were arrested and the CEO 
resigned. 151  Almost immediately, the board recruited Peter Löscher to become the first 
outsider to lead the company as the CEO since Siemens’ founding.152 Within months, the 
company replaced over 80 percent of its top executives. 153 Ultimately, 80 percent of the 
managing board members left the company as well.154  
 
Despite the scandal, Siemens was able to revive its reputation and has continuously 
increased its revenue since the scandal.155 Surprisingly, some of its largest contracts in the US 
in the recent years have come from the US federal government.156 Since the scandal, Siemens 
has hired hundreds of compliance officers and is considered to be “a corporate standard-
bearer in its anticorruption efforts.”157  Moreover, although some predicted revenues would 
decrease when bribes were no longer offered to secure contracts, revenues increased. 158 
Bribery is an expensive proposition and the gains in obtaining the contracts were more than 
offset by the costs incurred in paying bribes.159  
 
The FCPA is not without its critics, however. Most frequently, the Act’s detractors 
contend that the FCPA is over-enforced and that the statute is vague and overly broad.  All 
this causes the confusion concerning which actions are illegal.160 The problem of ambiguity 
(the argument goes) is “compounded by the fact that fears of the negative consequences of 
indictment or conviction” make challenging aggressive theories of liability nearly impossible 
for private firms, whose (financial) success typically depends upon maintaining a positive 
                                                 
149 Id.  
150 Id.  
151 Id.  
152 Peter Loscher, The CEO of Siemens on Using a Scandal to Drive Change, HARVARD BUS. REV. 39 (Nov. 
2012). 
153 Id.  
154 Id.  
155 Id.; Graham Dietz & Nicole Gillespie, Rebuilding trust: How Siemens atoned for its sins, THE GUARDIAN, 
Mar. 26, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/recovering-business-trust-siemens. 
156 See, e.g., NNSA Awards Contract for Largest Federal Wind Farm to Siemens Government Technologies, 
Inc., Press Release, NNSA, Jan. 15, 2013, http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/windfarm011513; 
Company Overview of Siemens Government Technologies, Inc., BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, 
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=46571723. 
157 Vanessa Fuhrmans, Shrugging off Bribery Case, Siemans Gains Favor in U.S., Dec. 15, 2011, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203893404577098632947522176. 
158 A giant awakens, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 2010. 
159 See id. 
160 Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Reform Debate, 38 J. CORP. L. 325, 332 (2013) (“To 
take one example, critics make much of the fact that the FCPA’s definition of ‘foreign official’ includes ‘any 
officer or employee of a foreign government or and…instrumentality thereof.’ Concerns arise because the 
statute does not define the term ‘instrumentality,’ and some experienced attorneys and managers claim that they 
have a hard time figuring out who or what comes within its scope.” (citation omitted)). 
16 
reputation in the marketplace.161 Additionally, the FCPA may diminish the ability of US-
based firms to compete overseas with corporations who are not within the jurisdiction of the 
FCPA. These companies do not have the same incentives to avoid the bribing of foreign 
officials and may benefit unfairly.162 Finally, the FCPA does not necessarily cause US firms 
to act more ethically.  It may simply induce companies to resort to more sophisticated 
measures of hiding payments, and push bribery further under the radar.163  Yet, the Siemens 
case, discussed above, provides a counter-example to these fears. 
 
C. Comparing FCPA Sanctions to Chinese Sanctions 
 
The potential sanctions against violators available to the governments of the US and 
China differ notably. Under the FCPA, corporations may face up to a $2 million fine per 
violation and individuals may face up to a $100,000 fine per violation.164 Furthermore, for 
each count of bribery, an individual may face up to five years in prison.165 The SEC has the 
ability to pursue the equitable remedy of disgorgement of all profits due to the corrupt 
activity.166  
  
Under China’s Criminal Law, there are also criminal fines and potential confiscation of 
property.167 In practice, however, the fines have been modest under both the Criminal Law 
and the AUCL in comparison to the large settlements seen under the FCPA.168 Yet, although 
the fines may have been smaller, there is a potential for life imprisonment in China, 
something that ought to be a substantial concern for those operating in China, especially 
corporate executives.169  
 
       GSK was fined three billion yuan ($489 million) for paying bribes and five senior 
executives were sentenced to two to four years in prison. Partial to full reprieves were 
granted for all five by the Changsha Intermediate People's Court in central China's Hunan 
Province in September 2014. 170  Compared with previous criminal penalties imposed in 
similar commercial bribery cases, three billion yuan is the largest fine imposed thus far.171 
Yet, it is expected that other foreign firms and domestic firms will be subject to the same or 
even higher penalties for corruption in the future.172 Otherwise, there is a  risk that GSK will 
be perceived as a case of selective legal enforcement targeting foreign firms.  Enforcement of 
the laws across all firms may be necessary to demonstrate China’s commitment to the rule of 
law in the Chinese market economy.  
 
                                                 
161 Id., at 332. 
162 Krever, supra note 120, at 94. 
163 Id., at 101.   
164  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, supra note 128; McSorsley, supra 120, at 771. Prior to the 1998 
amendments, the penalties were only civil. 
165 Id.  
166 Krever, supra note 120, at 94. 
167 See Criminal Law of the P.R.C., supra, note 67. 
168 Martin Rogers, GSK: A Case Study, CHINA LAW & PRACTICE, July/August, 2014, 
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/3358958/Channel/9928/GSK-A-case-study.html, also available 
at, http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/52399256_1_0.pdf. 
169 See Criminal Law of the P.R.C., supra note 67. 
170 See GSK China hit with record fine, says sorry, CHINA DAILY, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-
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IV.  Why the GSK Bribery was Possible in China 
 
It is not enough to point out the seriousness and illegality of GSK’s behavior.  It is also 
important to identify the possible underlying causes of the alleged bribery in order to 
restructure the institutions that allow for commercial bribery. Without a deep understanding 
of the causes of commercial bribery, it is difficult to prevent other MNCs from engaging in 
bribery. This Part examines several distinct features of doing business in China that MNCs 
should consider when designing corporate governance structures to guard against the 
temptation to offer bribes. 
 
A. Misinterpretation of Contemporary Chinese Culture 
 
MNCs may misinterpret China’s connection-based society and conclude that it is 
appropriate to bribe potential institutional buyers, especially public hospitals in China.173 But 
this ignores China’s contemporary efforts at reform. It is true that the Chinese market 
economy is not yet well-developed. 174  It took China three decades to transform from a 
centrally planned economy to a free market economy since the late 1970s when Deng 
Xiaoping, the late paramount leader, came to power in China.175 Usually, there is no foreign 
capital in a planned economy, while there is no legitimacy of bribery in a market economy.176 
Unspoken, hidden rules prevailed in the planned economy, while open, transparent legal rules 
should prevail in a market economy.177 In a free market, consumers choose which goods and 
services they will purchase on the basis of price and quality. 178 Thus, in such a system, 
consumer access to information concerning the price and quality of goods and services 
(market transparency) is paramount.179  
 
Unspoken rules might not have completely disappeared in the process of transition from 
a planned economy to a market economy, as the emerging twins, the rule of law and the 
market economy, have not been fully-fledged.180 The National People’s Congress, however, 
inserted the rule of law into the first paragraph of Article 5 of the Constitution on March 15, 
1999, declaring, “the People’s Republic of China shall govern the country with the rule of 
law, and shall build the socialist country with rule of law.”181 One of the latest comprehensive 
reform policies made by the ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party, on November 12, 
2013, endorsed the rule of law. Keeping in mind the bitter lessons of the ten years of the 
Cultural Revolution, the rule of law has become the social consensus in contemporary 
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China.182 In addition, to further detailed reform plans, China published twelve core values 
including national goals of prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony; social goals of 
freedom, equality, justice and the rule of law; and individual values of patriotism, dedication, 
integrity and friendship.183 
 
Ignoring Chinese contemporary efforts and commitments to a free and open market, the 
rule of law, and modernization of state governance, some MNCs seek to hire so-called 
“elites” with good connections in China to join their subsidiaries in China.184 Retired officers, 
or relatives or close friends of current officers, are favorite candidates for the positions of 
senior executives in China subsidiaries.185 Of course, some of Chinese domestic corporations 
have been also behaving this way. But in the past few years, China has begun to investigate 
and punish commercial bribery and the related corrupt activities committed by retired 
officers, or relatives or close friends of current officers. So far, over 60 government officials 
at the provincial and ministerial levels, or above, are under investigation.186 
 
More importantly, connection-based bribery has been a special target in contemporary 
Chinese society.187 Anti-corruption efforts and reforms toward a transparent and competitive 
market are key elements of the contemporary Chinese culture. 188 A misunderstanding of 
contemporary Chinese culture may have created, and may continue to create, more bribery 
scandals on the part of the MNCs. 189   It is important for MNCs to recognize that 
contemporary Chinese culture does not tolerate bribery. 
 
B.  Optimization of Profits  
 
Many MNCs, including GSK, may see maximization of profits as their sole goal.190 In 
fact, exploring and expanding their market shares may be the first priority of MNCs entering 
the Chinese market. Yet, in the age of globalization and the Internet, emerging theories 
promoting the significance of non-shareholder stakeholders and corporate social 
responsibility are challenging the conservative notion of maximization of profits at all 
costs.191 
 
As early as October 27, 2005, the Chinese legislature inserted a corporate social 
responsibility clause into the first paragraph of Article 5 of the Corporate Law stating: “In its 
operational activities, a company shall abide by laws and administrative regulations, observe 
social morals and commercial ethics, persist in honesty and good faith, accept supervision by 
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the government and the public, and assume social responsibility.”192 
 
Similarly, as the result of five years of negotiation and bargaining among many different 
stakeholders across the world, the International Standard Organization issued ISO 
26000:2010, Guidance on Social Responsibility on November 1, 2010. 193  The Guidance 
provides harmonized, globally relevant guidelines for private and public sector organizations 
of all types, based on an international consensus among expert representatives of the main 
stakeholder groups, and encourages the implementation of best practices in social 
responsibility worldwide.194  
 
ISO 26000:2010 represents an international consensus to some extent, as more than 600 
representatives from 99 governments and 42 international organizations 195 —including 
representatives from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), industry, consumer groups, 
and labor organizations—were involved in its development.196 The text is currently available 
in 22 languages, and a recent survey performed by the ISO 26000 Post Publication 
Organization found that “at least 60 countries have adopted the standard,” with 20 other 
countries actively pursuing adoption.197 Notable applications of the ISO 26000 guidelines 
have included a project in the Middle East/North Africa to create a pool of national social 
responsibility experts in eight pilot countries, the use of the guidelines by Germany’s Federal 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the implementation of the 
guidelines by many well-known companies. 198  Although ISO 26000:2010 is a voluntary 
standard, it helps clarify social responsibility by translating principles into effective actions, 
and sharing global best practices.199  
 
Optimization of profits, instead of maximization of profits, is the logical reflection of 
corporate responsibility and business ethics in the corporate core value framework. Profit 
optimization represents a certain degree of restraint, requiring reasonable profits to be made 
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in legal, ethical, and respected ways. 
 
This conclusion finds ample support in the literature surrounding the recent corporate 
social responsibility movement, which seeks to augment the factors that motivate corporate 
decision-making.200 Proponents of the movement, for instance argue that the myriad interests 
relate to and should play a direct role in deciding corporate affairs, including (but not limited 
to) the concerns of environmentalists, creditors, consumers, and employees.201 According to 
this theory the possessors of these interests, “stakeholders,” have a right to participate in 
corporate decision-making.202 
 
In contrast, under the more recently proposed Team Production Theory, the actors 
involved in and affected by corporate affairs are all part of a team.203 The team comes about 
because the participants all believe they will gain more from acting in concert than they 
would through individual action.204 Because all have participated in bringing about the team 
production, the (corporate) profits of that production must be allocated accordingly.205 Under 
the theory, because the effects of an individual team member’s participation are difficult to 
isolate, profits must be allocated by the board of directors via a political process. 206 
 
In recent years, these theories have done much to promote widespread awareness of the 
corporate social responsibility movement. Yet neither theory is completely satisfactory. While 
the team production theory conceptualizes corporate work product and decision making as 
collaborative enterprises dependent upon a panoply of stakeholders, by leaving the allocation 
of rents up to the discretion of corporate board members, the theory is descriptive rather than 
normative.207 Critics claim that in reality, under this theory, the allocation of profit is “a 
matter of power rather than principle.”208 Stakeholder theory, by contrast departs from the 
underlying ideals of the corporate social responsibility movement in the opposite fashion. 
Rather than live up to the movement’s goals of spurring more sustainable and inclusive 
business practices, stakeholder theory, taken to its logical extremes, may provide boards with 
so much discretion in decision-making that being accountable to everyone could result in 
being accountable to no one.209   
 
As reflected in the recent backlash to the GSK scandal, and as embodied by the Chinese 
Corporate Law mandate that companies “observe social morals and commercial ethics…and 
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assume social responsibility,”210 the goal of the corporate responsibility movement is not to 
hijack the corporate form. To the contrary, its purpose is to impress upon corporations, and 
especially upon MNCs like GSK, the necessity of subjecting their pursuit of profits to ethical 
and legal limitations. For this reason, it is the concept of optimizing profits—of maximizing 
profits within the boundaries set by legal, moral, and cultural standards—that best 
encapsulates the global movement that continues to call for more sustainable and inclusive 
business practices.    
 
Moreover, in addition to providing a framework in which firms will be encouraged to 
protect the interests of their stakeholders, embracing profit optimization will typically be in 
the companies’ long-term profit-maximizing interests. This is especially true in emerging 
markets like China, where decreases in corruption have been linked to significant growth in 
gross domestic product per capita, which should in turn mean increased demand for MNC 
products in these markets.211 Additionally, by refusing to engage in corrupt practices, MNCs 
would avoid paying the heavy transaction costs associated with commercial bribery. 212 
Hence, it is important for companies like GSK, which has invested heavily in China, to 
recognize that there is a great deal to be gained (both for themselves and their stakeholders) 
through playing by the rule of law.  Without such a fundamental change in corporate thinking 
about maximization of profits, scandals such as the one embroiling GSK are likely to repeat 
themselves on the global stage.213  
 
C. Strengthening Corporate Governance to Address Corruption 
 
Many MNCs, including GSK, oppose corruption in their corporate policies or internal 
rules.214 It would be both unwise and almost unheard of for an MNC to be silent on the anti-
corruption issue.215 Therefore, the core issue is not whether the MNC has a corporate anti-
corruption policy, but instead, whether the corporate governance policy regarding anti-
corruption translates well into commercial practice.216  
 
When the Chinese authorities began investigating GSK’s China operations, GSK China 
issued a statement regarding the ongoing investigation on July 15, 2013, saying: 
 
[w]e are deeply concerned and disappointed by these 
serious allegations of fraudulent behavior and ethical 
misconduct by certain individuals at the company and 
third-party agencies. Such behavior would be a clear breach 
of GSK's systems, governance procedures, values and 
standards. GSK has zero tolerance for any behavior of this 
nature. GSK shares the desire of the Chinese authorities to 
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root out corruption. These allegations are shameful and we 
regret this has occurred.217  
 
This statement demonstrates that GSK has specific systems, governance procedures, values, 
and standards designed to address the bribery scandal and other corrupt practices.  
 
  
      The Chinese government spokesperson alleged in September 2013 that the wrongdoing 
was organized by GSK China.218 Furthermore, he claimed “the company passed the buck to 
the salesforce, but the police investigation has found that GSK China went through the 
motions in internal auditing so as not to discover these violations.”219 GSK has continuously 
stated that the head office of GSK had no prior knowledge about the wrongdoing of the 
Chinese salesforce while fully cooperating with Chinese authorities.220  
 
Despite these claims, five senior executives of GSK were found in violation of the anti-
corruption laws.221 In order to prove criminal and civil liability of the top executives in GSK, 
the Chinese authorities had to prove breach of fiduciary duties.222 This required proof that the 
executives had knowledge of the bribery or should have reasonably known about it. 
 
Considering GSK’s long-standing position against corruption, the question becomes why 
is it embroiled in a bribery scandal.223 There must have been a problem with execution of 
corporate governance policies and translation of formal anticorruption policies and norms 
into practical reality. After meeting with the officials of the Chinese Ministry of Public 
Security, Abbas Hussain, the GSK President International – Europe, Japan, Emerging 
Markets & Asia Pacific, said on July 22, 2013, “certain senior executives of GSK China, who 
know our systems well, appear to have acted outside of our processes and controls which 
breaches Chinese law. We have zero tolerance for any behavior of this nature.”224  
 
Hussain’s comment worked to insulate GSK’s head office from the accusation of the 
corporate wrongdoing at the level of corporate values and policies, and to separate the 
wrongdoings of senior executives from GSK China and the global GSK group. GSK Chief 
Executive, Sir Andrew Witty, also admitted that the four executives appeared to have worked 
around the corporate control processes to commit the alleged crimes.225 No charges have 
been filed against the global GSK groups to date. 
 
Yet, there were apparently at least two serious failures of the corporate governance 
policies of GSK. First, certain senior executives of GSK China have breached Chinese law.  
Five senior executives of GSK were found to have actively organized, pushed forward and 
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implemented a sales force involved with bribery. Second, the internal systems of GSK were 
unable to prevent GSK employees from engaging in corrupt behaviors.  Even before the GSK 
conviction for commercial bribery, GSK’s stated policies were to promote corporate social 
responsibility and ensure accountability. For instance, its mission is “to improve the quality 
of human life by enabling people to do more, feel better, [and] live longer,” and it claimed, 
“we have a robust structure in place to ensure the approach we take on corporate 
responsibility is appropriate. Our board-level Corporate Responsibility Committee (CRC) has 
overall oversight and sits within a clear organizational structure that ensures 
accountability.”226  
 
If the corporate governance policies of GSK had functioned effectively, no crimes should 
have been committed. It is easy to adopt corporate governance provisions and anticorruption 
rules. It is also easy to organize a committee to address the issue of corruption within a 
corporation. What is difficult—and even more important—is ensuring that such measures are 
effective. GSK’s failure lies not in the lack of corporate social responsibility measures, but 
instead in the functional (in)effectiveness of these governance norms.  
 
GSK acknowledged this failure following the criminal verdict. The company posted an 
apology on its Chinese website, saying that it "fully accepts the facts and evidence of the 
investigation, and the verdict of the Chinese judicial authorities.” GSK "sincerely apologizes 
to the Chinese patients, doctors and hospitals, and to the Chinese Government and the 
Chinese people" and "deeply regrets the damage caused.” It also apologized for harm caused 
by its illegal private investigation. The apology described the events as a clear breach of 
GSK's governance and "wholly contrary to the values and standards we expect from our 
employees.”227 
 
As the GSK scandal illustrates, it is insufficient, or even meaningless, to discuss the 
institutional innovations of corporate governance on the books without noting the 
significance of exploring mechanisms for converting good norms into formal and effective 
practices. Of course, formalization of corporate governance does not mean that all corporate 
rules are compatible with anticorruption policies. To the contrary, some of GSK’s rules, 
especially the evaluation and incentive system for professional sales representatives, may 
have been key factors in triggering the bribery scandal.228  
 
 
V.  The Need for Reform of the Evaluation and Incentive System for Professional Sales 
Representatives 
 
GSK’s evaluation and incentive systems for professional sales representatives may help 
explain why senior executives and professional sales representatives of GSK were engaging 
in corrupt practices. Under the traditional compensation system of GSK, bonuses for sales 
professionals were based on individual achievement of sales targets.229 Simply put, the more 
drugs sold, the more bonuses received.  
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On its face, this compensation system sounds reasonable and fair. Yet, professional sales 
representatives may have been incentivized to offer bribes to gain a competitive advantage. 
When GSK evaluated its senior executives and professional sales representatives based only 
on the sales of market shares, employees may have considered offering bribes, regardless of 
illegality. Great bonuses arising from bribery may have been expected, while legal 
prosecution was uncertain. From the perspective of GSK employees, bribery may have been a 
great game of small input and large return. Motivated by the maximization of profits for GSK 
and the maximization of compensation for the professional sales representatives, it may have 
been very difficult for the management of GSK to stop or even slow down perceived 
profitable bribery practices. 
 
In fact, the sales targets-orientated compensation policy may have been the primary 
cause, not just of bribes to doctors, but also of fraud to consumers. It is likely not a 
coincidence that GSK was required to execute a five-year Corporate Integrity Agreement 
(CIA) with the US Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General 
(HHS-OIG) in 2012 in the US.230 The plea agreement and the CIA included novel provisions 
requiring GSK to implement and/or maintain major changes to the way it does business.  
These changes include changing the way its sales force is compensated to remove 
compensation based on sales goals for territories, one of the driving forces behind much of 
the conduct at issue.231 Under the CIA, GSK is required to change its executive compensation 
program to permit the company to recoup annual bonuses and long-term incentives from 
covered executives if they, or their subordinates, engage in significant misconduct.232 GSK 
may recoup monies from executives who are current employees and those who have left the 
company. Among other things, the CIA also requires GSK to implement and maintain 
transparency in its research practices and publication policies and to follow specified policies 
in its contracts with various health care payers.233 To some extent, the CIA paved the way for 
GSK to change its traditional compensation system in China in 2014. 
 
A. Fundamental Change in Compensation: From Unitary Sales Target Orientation 
to Diversified Evaluation Indicators 
 
After recognizing the relationship between its sales target-oriented evaluation and 
incentive system and the ever increasing amount of bribery, beginning in January 2014, GSK 
began to implement fundamental changes to its evaluation and incentive system.234  Under 
the new system, employees who interact with customers will be evaluated according to their 
technical knowledge, quality of service, and adherence to the company values of 
transparency, integrity, respect, and patient-focus.235 The new system will apply to all GSK 
sales employees who interact with prescribing healthcare professionals including sales 
representatives and sales managers.236 In addition to its implementation in China, the new 
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system will be implemented in other markets around the world.  GSK promised that the new 
system would be fully implemented in all of the countries in which it operates by early 
2015.237 
 
Regarding the rationale behind the change of the compensation system, Hervé Gisserot, 
Senior Vice President and General Manager of GSK Pharmaceuticals and Vaccines China, 
explained: “The new sales compensation system will enable us to put patients’ needs at the 
heart of everything that we do. Our medical representatives are the gateway to our customers 
and it is important we inspire, coach and ultimately reward people working within the 
organization to focus on behaviors, which reflect our values. I am confident that this industry-
leading initiative will help GSK to continue to build a sustainable business in China and 
make a strong contribution to the development of the Chinese healthcare system.”238  Further, 
according to Gisserot, GSK has demonstrated its determination to pursue a patient friendly 
business model—to find a means of linking the company’s core values and its sustainable 
development, the welfare of the patients and the incentives of its medical representatives.239 
The rationale behind the new system should be welcome to both medical representatives and 
patients alike.  
 
Gisserot’s comments suggest the three failures of corporate governance described above: 
sole reliance on a maximization of profits-oriented philosophy, misunderstanding of Chinese 
contemporary culture, and the failure of corporate governance policies to combat 
corruption.240 Identifying the corporate governance failures, however, is only the first step 
toward stakeholder-friendly governance. The effectiveness of the new compensation system 
remains to be tested by all stakeholders. 
 
B.  Shortcomings of the New Compensation System 
 
The criminal investigation of GSK appears to have prompted the introduction of its new 
compensation system. Under pressure from the public and the media, GSK changed the 
visible rules directly contributing to corrupt practices. In addition to developing the strategy 
with regard to public relations, GSK has weighed the potential benefits and costs associated 
with the new compensation system.241 
 
As announced by GSK on December 18, 2013, “these changes build on the successful 
introduction of GSK’s 'Patient First’ program in the United States in 2011. Experiences from 
the U.S. have shown this more patient-focused approach has significantly improved customer 
interactions. It has also coincided with a period of growth for GSK’s U.S. business.”242 This 
implies that GSK sees positive effects from the CIA. The effects are in the best interests of 
GSK and the public, especially the patients.  Furthermore, it seems that the new 
compensation system successfully implemented in the US could be applicable to the Chinese 
market.243 GSK’s new compensation system in China, however, has several shortcomings, 
compared with the promises made in its US CIA. 
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First, the new compensation system introduced in China is less detailed than its CIA 
Patient First program. Pursuant to the CIA, GSK agrees that it will not provide a financial 
reward (through compensation, including incentive compensation or otherwise) or discipline 
(through tangible employment action) to its prescribing field sales professionals 
(pharmaceutical sales representatives) or their direct managers based on the volume of GSK 
product sales within an employee’s territory, or within the manager’s district.244 The Patient 
First program includes evaluations for sales representatives based on business acumen, 
customer engagement, and scientific knowledge about GSK’s products.245 GSK agreed to 
maintain its Patient First Program, or a substantially equivalent program, for at least the 
duration of the CIA, absent agreement otherwise.  The restrictions on such tangible 
employment decisions are set forth in its Use of Territory/Individual Sales Data policy.246 In 
contrast, the information released on GSK’s website about the new compensation system in 
China is very general and ambiguous.247 This may be because GSK considers the details of 
the new compensation system in China confidential, but transparency of the new 
compensation system could win the trust of the public. 
 
Second, there is no financial recoupment program in China. In the CIA, GSK promised 
to establish and maintain, throughout the term of the CIA, a financial recoupment program 
that puts at risk of forfeiture and recoupment an amount equivalent to up to three years of 
annual performance pay (i.e., annual bonuses, plus long term incentives) for an executive 
who is discovered to have been involved in any significant misconduct.248 This financial 
recoupment program applies to executives who are either current GSK employees or who 
were former GSK employees.249 GSK also committed to maintaining an Executive Financial 
Recoupment Program for at least the duration of the CIA, absent agreement otherwise.250 
Both the incentive and the restraint mechanisms are essential to preventing excessive 
emphasis on sales targets. Although GSK promised a new compensation system in China, it 
has not yet announced an Executive Financial Recoupment Program in China.  
 
Third, there is no independent review mechanism in China from a third party equivalent 
to the Independent Review Organization (IRO) as defined in the CIA. In the CIA, within 120 
days after the effective date, GSK is required to engage an entity (or entities), such as an 
accounting, auditing, or consulting firm, to perform reviews to assist it in assessing and 
evaluating its systems, processes, policies, procedures, and practices.251 Without independent 
verification and oversight, it would be difficult to convince the public of the effectiveness of 
the new Chinese compensation program. Theoretically speaking, GSK would benefit from 
the independent review mechanism in terms of better corporate image and long-term 
development. 
 
Fourth, there is no mechanism for the Chinese government to punish GSK for failure to 
comply with its promises. In the US, the 2012 CIA has a section on dealing with “breach and 
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default.” 252  GSK agreed that failure to comply with the obligations to establish and 
implement the employee and executive incentive compensation and recoupment may lead to 
the imposition of stipulated penalty of $2,500 for each day.253 As the new compensation 
system in China is the unilateral policy declared by GSK, it is up to GSK to discipline the 
breach of the system in the framework of internal controls. The public, however, might not 
trust the effectiveness of the internal controls of GSK, as they have witnessed the failure of 
the internal controls in the bribery scandal in 2013.  
 
Fifth, no comprehensive corporate integrity obligation was imposed on GSK in the new 
compensation system in China. In the 2012 CIA, GSK promised to establish and maintain a 
compliance program in the US, and especially to add compliance responsibilities for certain 
GSK employees and the board of directors.  This program includes appointing a Compliance 
Officer, a Compliance Committee, and assigning the Board compliance obligations. The 
Board is further required to adopt a written Code of Conduct and written policies and 
procedures relating to the training of management and relevant employees.254 
 
Despite the shortcomings of the new compensation system of GSK in China, many 
pharmaceutical MNCs are eager to know its fate. Although other pharmaceuticals have not 
yet followed GSK’s new compensation model, some MNCs may be willing to follow it to 
avoid regulatory risks. On the other hand, some MNCs may be reluctant to follow GSK’s 
new model before the model proves successful.255  
 
VI. Suggested Corporate Governance Reforms 
 
This Part offers our proposals for governance reforms, in an attempt to reduce the 
incentives for corporate executives to engage in acts of bribery when doing business in 
China. Our proposals include a reorientation of the corporate purpose from profit 
maximization to profit optimization, the need to understand Chinese culture and society, and 
the execution of corporate governance practices that directly address corruption. 
 
A. Reorientation of Corporate Purpose to Optimization of Profits  
 
An ancient Chinese proverb deeply describes the profit driven world: “Jostling and 
joyous, the whole world comes after profit; racing and rioting, after profit the whole world 
goes.” 256 Maximization of profits has been one of the most powerful driving forces for 
entrepreneurship, innovation and progress in the human history, especially in the corporate 
age.257 Maximization of profits, however, may incentivize some corporations desperate for 
profits and ignorant of the interests of other stakeholders.258  
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The tricky issue is that although many corporate citizens condemn corrupt practices as 
unethical and illegal, or even crimes, and business leaders declare zero tolerance for corrupt 
practices in their corporate policies,259 such promises and policies tend to be subordinate to 
the purpose of maximizing profits for the corporation and its shareholders.260 The reason 
some anticorruption policies fail is that corruption is sometimes considered the price the 
corporation has to pay in certain circumstances.261 Yet, maximization of profits per se does 
not justify engaging in corrupt activities.  
 
Because corporations are important members of society, we argue that it is imperative 
that they revise their mission of profit maximization by replacing “maximization” with 
“optimization.”  First, optimization of profits implies a broader inclusion of stakeholders. 
Traditionally, the shareholder has been considered the primary corporate stakeholder.262  The 
purpose of the modern corporation, however, should be to create wealth for its shareholders 
and other stakeholders harmoniously, but not necessarily in the same ways. In addition to 
advancing investment returns for shareholders and compensating directors and executives, 
the creation and growth of the corporation should also benefit other stakeholders or 
constituencies. 263 Profit is not adequate to describe the purpose of a corporation, as the 
interests or stakes owned by the non-shareholder constituencies do not necessarily take the 
form of profit.264 It is unnecessary to narrowly interpret corporate interest solely in terms of 
shareholder interest.265  
 
Second, optimization of profits implies legal and ethical profit making. It demands that 
profits be acquired for various stakeholders—including shareholders, employees, consumers, 
creditors, competitors, suppliers, retailers, the community, future generations of people, the 
natural environment, and other stakeholders—in lawful, ethical, and respectful ways. In the 
pursuit of this ideal balance of interests, we argue for compromise, tolerance, and 
inclusiveness. Corruption has seriously eroded cooperation among corporations and their 
stakeholders, infringed upon the rights of consumers and competitors, and thereby destroyed 
the confidence of both the business community and the public in fair competition in a free 
market.266 Optimization of profits does not prohibit corporations from being profitable. Being 
profitable is not the problem. The problem arises when firms seek to profit in an illegal or 
unethical way. 
 
Third, optimization of profits implies the sustainable development of the corporation. 
Indeed, there are tensions between short-term interests and long-term interests, between the 
shareholder’s interest and non-shareholder constituencies’ interests, between the visible 
financial interest and invisible public reputation, between short-term tactics and long-term 
strategy, and between short-term revenue generation and long-term competitiveness. 267 
Optimization of profits, however, guides the corporation with a long-term vision of 
sustainable development and helps to pave the way to sustainable business success. MNCs 
need to consider their long-term interests, public reputations, long-term strategies, long-term 
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competitiveness, and the core interests of their non-shareholder constituencies when 
optimizing profits. 
 
 It is a longstanding maxim in corporate law that business corporations are “organized and 
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders”268 and that, accordingly, corporate 
board members and officers owe a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder profits.269 Yet 
such a duty, if it exists at all,270 can easily coexist with profit optimization. Because a firm’s 
market reputation plays a considerable role in determining its valuation and profits, it will 
almost always be in the firm’s best (long-term profit maximizing) interest to pay close 
attention to the stakeholder concerns noted above. This is particularly true of MNCs. As our 
GSK case study exemplifies, when such companies fail to live up to stakeholder standards, 
the news is unlikely to fall on deaf ears. Hence, profit optimization stands, not only to 
promote a broader array of stakeholder interests, but also to prevent corporate fiduciaries 
from sacrificing their firms’ long-term financial welfare in the pursuit of short-term profits.    
  
B.  The Need for Understanding Chinese Culture 
 
Firms need to bear in mind both China’s past and present and draw conclusions from both 
China’s accomplishments and the Chinese way of thinking. One can hardly understand China 
well without a proper understanding of China’s history, culture, the Chinese people’s way of 
thinking, and the profound changes taking place in China today.271 It would be unwise for 
MNCs to follow the so-called “unspoken rules” of corruption. The better choice for MNCs is 
to conduct their business in lawful and ethical ways, and to adopt a policy of zero tolerance 
for corruption, despite heavy pressure from the competition. By doing so, MNCs will lower 
their own transaction costs in China, as well as spur more demand for their products.272 In 
promoting these ends, the most important step is to gain a deeper understanding of Chinese 
culture and rule of law. 
 
C.  Corporate Governance Practices Must Address Corruption 
 
As mentioned above, many MNCs, including GSK, have anti-corruption policies.  
Unfortunately, the policies and the norms of good corporate governance have not always 
translated into practice. Thus, the key issue is how to implement good corporate governance 
policies regarding anti-corruption. To achieve this, three factors would be equally important: 
good people, good norms, and good culture.  Furthermore, we suggest that MNCs implement 
the following practices. 
 
First, a consumer friendly compensation system should be implemented by MNCs to 
better reflect the competence and performance of the marketing employees or representatives 
based on consumer primacy.  Although it was encouraging for GSK to announce a new 
compensation system in late 2013, as noted above, its system still has shortcomings and 
weaknesses. We have several suggestions for reform for GSK and other MNCs facing the 
                                                 
268 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
269 Robert Ashford, Binary Economics, Fiduciary Duties, and Corporate Social Responsibility: Comprehending 
Corporate Wealth Maximization and Distribution for Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Society, 76 TUL. L. REV. 
1531, 1558 (2002). 
270 See id. (discussing reasons to doubt the existence of a specific fiduciary duty to maximize profits). 
271 Jinping, supra note 45. 
272 Id. 
30 
same challenges. 
 
The most important suggestion is to hear the opinions of the consumers, including the 
patients. It is unlikely that a compensation system will be truly consumer friendly if the 
system has not been heard, debated, and discussed by the public consumers. Another 
important requirement of a revised compensation system is that it must accommodate the 
core interest of the employees or representatives. Without the support of the marketing 
employees or representatives, it would be unlikely that a consumer friendly compensation 
system would succeed. In addition, a consumer friendly compensation system should be 
made transparent in order to enable and facilitate public supervision. Finally, both corporate 
employees and independent sales representatives or agents should be evaluated by the 
consumer friendly compensation system. To control the legal risk of corruption, some MNCs 
might attempt to outsource marketing to independent agents, representatives, or 
intermediaries reasoning that this strategy may insulate the firm from corruption. We argue 
that MNCs should also be held accountable for the selection and oversight of the independent 
intermediaries. Independent intermediaries must also be prohibited from engaging in bribery. 
 
Second, internal punishments, including financial recoupment, should be adopted to 
improve governance on anti-corruption. In the 2012 US CIA, GSK promised to establish and 
maintain a financial recoupment program that puts at risk of forfeiture and recoupment an 
amount equivalent to up to three years of annual performance pay for an executive who is 
discovered to have been involved in any significant misconduct.273 GSK, however, has not 
announced a similar program in China. A recoupment program could help deter and prevent 
executives of MNCs from engaging in misconduct, including consumer fraud and bribery. In 
addition to the executives, the directors and marketing employees should be subject to the 
recoupment program. To increase the cost of corruption, firms could seek to impose penalties 
in the case of intentional misconduct or gross negligence resulting in corruption. 
 
Third, an independent third party review mechanism should be established to fight 
against corruption. An MNC’s internal review of the effectiveness and weakness of anti-
corruption practices is unreliable from the perspective of the public, including the 
competitors and the consumers. Furthermore, if the independent review organization is 
selected and paid by the corporation, there is a possibility that the corporation will in effect 
control the review organization. Some review organizations might thus close their eyes to the 
ongoing corrupt practices.  Therefore. corporations should not nominate the members of the 
organizations. We recommend that the independent review organizations be selected by a 
government agency based on open, fair, transparent, and competitive procurement 
procedures. The public should be entitled to inspect the review documents and raise questions 
before the independent review organizations, either individually or at a hearing procedure 
organized by the government agency. The review organization could be funded through a fee 
imposed on corporations. 
 
Fourth, penalties should be imposed on corrupt practices of multinational corporations. 
The market has eyes, the law has teeth. Civil liabilities, administrative liabilities, and criminal 
liabilities are different, but interconnected. In the case of massive infringement of consumer 
rights, the China Consumers’ Association or the consumers associations at the provincial 
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level may take up public interest lawsuits on the behalf of consumers. 274 In the case of 
administrative or criminal penalties imposed on a wrongdoing corporation, the fine should 
not exclude a consumer’s claim to damages. In addition to consumer litigation, the 
competitors should be permitted to file lawsuits against a wrongdoing corporation for 
compensation and injunctions. In China, penalties imposed on those offering bribes are 
usually less harsh than those imposed on bribe recipients, in order to encourage the bribing 
firms to report to the government or the judicial system.275 Both sides of the transaction, 
however, benefit from bribes.  As a result, MNCs, as the providers and beneficiaries of 
bribes, are not motivated to act as whistleblowers with respect to corrupt practices. The 
administrative penalties prescribed by Article 22 of the Unfair Competition Law of 1993 are 
minimal with regard to briberies not serious enough to amount to crimes; the regulator may 
fine from RMB 10,000 (equivalent to USD 1,600) up to RMB 200,000 (equivalent to USD 
32,000) depending on the circumstances and the illegal income.276 Administrative penalties 
need to be made harsher in order to deter and punish corporate corruption. Although plea-
bargaining is unfamiliar to Chinese law, it is highly recommended that China introduce it to 
decrease the costs of investigation and improve the efficiency of legal enforcement, given the 
limited resources of regulators and the judicial system.  
 
Fifth, anti-corruption practices should be added to the corporate governance structures of 
MNCs. Based on the successful experience of the corporate integrity obligation imposed by 
the 2012 CIA, corporations should be encouraged to establish an anticorruption committee 
under the board of directors, and to create the position of Chief Anticorruption Officer (CAO) 
at the management level. The board of directors should be responsible for the CAO’s 
nomination and removal and the CAO should report on a timely basis.  The board of directors 
should have a duty to monitor and evaluate whether corruption exists within the corporation. 
A practical code of conduct of anticorruption should be learned and followed by the 
employees, especially those engaged in marketing. Needless to say, as MNCs and their 
directors, executives, and employees are sensitive to negative impacts on their reputations, 
corruption records of directors, executives and employees should be made available to the 
public.277 
 
 In keeping with this approach, it would be helpful for China and other nations hosting 
MNCs to adopt sentencing policies similar to those found in the US federal Organizational 
Sentencing Guidelines (OSGs) 278  and in the US prosecutorial practice of encouraging 
organizational cooperation through deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-
prosecution agreements (NPAs). The OSGs allow leniency if the organization reports an 
offense to the government, cooperates fully in the investigation, and demonstrates its 
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recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility.279  
  
 Similarly, by offering NPAs and DPAs, prosecutors create serious incentives for 
corporate cooperation with criminal investigations. Based on a recent Government 
Accountability Office report, NPAs and DPAs have significantly reduced the use of court 
resources in dealing with FCPA violations. 280  Moreover, the NPA/DPA process typically 
allows the DOJ to engage in more active communication with FCPA violators, with favorable 
settlements often being dependent on the MNC’s adoption of company-specific policies for 
combatting corruption. 281  Such agreements frequently include “monitorship provisions,” 
which require companies to hire an independent corporate monitor to oversee their 
compliance efforts throughout the period of the agreement. 282 This has been particularly 
common in cases involving FCPA violations. 283  Companies have also been required to 
employ independent ethics and compliance consultants to examine their ethics and 
compliance programs.284 Moreover, in addition to stiff fines, 285 NPAs and DPAs typically 
include non-contradiction clauses, which prevent companies from subsequently denying any 
admissions of guilt made in an agreement.286  In return for paying penalties and complying 
with the agreements’ other provisions, companies typically avoid indictment and conviction, 
along with suspension and debarment from government, a considerable carrot for most 
MNCs.287  
 
By relying on such strategies, countries hosting MNCs will likely establish an 
atmosphere much more conducive to the cooperative policing and prevention of corporate 
corruption. In such an environment, MNCs would have even less reason to avoid seriously 
engaging in corporate governance measures to prevent crimes like bribery. 
 
Conclusion  
 
GSK acquired significant competitive advantages by bribing hospitals, doctors, officials, 
and professional medical organizations. It is true that in general, firms seek to be competitive 
and strong in the market. To this end, however, firms operating in a free market should focus 
on improving their competitiveness through, for example, diversity and quality of goods or 
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services, marketing strategies, post-sale services, internal controls, and public relations.288 
Moreover, firms should acquire or consolidate competitive advantages in a fair, ethical, and 
lawful manner. Bribery, however, is none of these and is an illegal, inefficient, and immoral 
trade practice.289 
 
Although it is impossible to eliminate all corruption in the global market, a policy of zero 
tolerance for corruption should acquire global consensus.  In addition to tougher punishments 
of corrupt practices and a more liberal, transparent and competitive market based on the rule 
of law in the host countries of MNCs, more efficient international coordination mechanisms 
based on shared information and mutual assistance should be expected. The reason for this is 
simple. Corrupt practices are the common enemy in the global economy. MNCs should play 
the leading role in changing traditional corporate governance by reorienting corporate 
purpose, gaining a deeper understanding of host country culture, and adopting and employing 
serious corporate governance policies against corruption.  
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